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ESTATE TAXATION OF CHARITABLE REMAINDERS
SUBJECT TO POWERS OF DIVERSION
By GARRETT POWER*
I. THE CONTEXT
The last of a lineage often presents the following testamentary
desire to his lawyer: "I wish to leave the bulk of my estate to charity
but at the same time to assure that my beloved wife lives out her last
days in comfort." The lawyer's task of drafting a will to effect this
desire is not difficult. A testamentary trust may be established with
the income payable to the testator's wife for life and the remainder
interest passing to charity. As a hedge against the inadequacy of
the income, the trustee may be empowered to invade the corpus of the
trust if the wife needs additional funds for comfortable support. Such
an arrangement assures the wife financial security even in the event
of a stock market crash or a long and expensive illness, so long as the
testator's total assets are sufficient, and at the same time assures that
the charity will eventually receive that portion of the remainder interest
that the wife does not need.
The only flaw in such a plan is that it may substantially enrich the
federal government, primarily at the expense of the charity. Generally
under section 2055 of the Internal Revenue Code transfers to charity'
may be deducted for federal estate tax purposes; but if the transfer
to charity cannot be valued at the time of the testator's death no
deduction will be allowed, the result being a higher tax and a smaller
remainder interest for the charity. This article will examine the law
as developed by the courts and the Regulations as promulgated by the
Treasury to determine when a charitable remainder which is subject
to diversion to a private use is deductible.
II. THE LAW
The deductibility of an interest transferred in trust for both a
charitable and private purpose has troubled courts since the inception
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; A.B.
1960; LL.B. 1962, Duke University; LL.M. 1965, University of Illinois.
1. Section 2055 establishes certain qualifications that a charity must meet in order
to qualify. See INT. Rev. CoDs op 1954, § 2055 (a) (1)-(4). Throughout this paper
when a bequest to charity is referred to, it is assumed that the recipient has met
these qualifications.
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of the charitable deduction. The charitable deduction was first in-
corporated into the estate tax by section 403(a)(3) of the Revenue
Act of 1918. Although section 403(a)(3) and its successors have
never explicitly permitted the deduction of future interests, the Treasury
has consistently recognized that a charitable remainder 'subject to
a life estate for a private beneficiary is deductible.' The value of the
charity's interest is determined actuarially by subtracting from the
value of assets transferred the value of the intervening life interest.'
However, when someone is empowered to divert a portion of the
charitable remainder to a private beneficiary the deduction becomes
questionable. The federal courts have agreed on a verbalization of
the formula to be used to determine the deductibility of such interests.
It is generally said that two requirements must be met: first, the
power of diversion must be limited by an "ascertainable standard";
and second, the possibility of any diversion or diversion in excess
of a calculable portion of the charitable remainder must be so remote
as to be negligible.4 These requirements must 'be carefully scrutinized
if they are to -be useful in explaining the results in the cases.
A. THE "DEFINITELY ASCERTAINABLE STANDARD" REQUIREMENT.
1. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
The Supreme Court first addressed itself to the question of the
deductibility of a charitable remainder subject to a power of diversion
in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States.5 In this case the court was
construing a will which provided that the residue of the testator's estate
was to pass in trust for the benefit of the testator's wife for life with
authority in the trustee to use the corpus "that may be necessary to
suitably maintain her in as much comfort as she now enjoys."' After
the wife's death, the remainder was to pass to charity. Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the court, said:
The case presents two questions the first of which is whether
the provision for the maintenance of the wife made the gifts to
charity so uncertain that the deduction of the amount of those
gifts from the gross estate under § 403(a) (3) [predecessor of
I.R.C. § 2055] . . . cannot be allowed. . . . This we are of the
opinion must be answered in the negative. The principal that
could be used was only so much as might be necessary to con-
tinue the comfort then enjoyed. The standard was fixed in fact
and capable of being stated in definite terms of money. It was
not left to the widow's discretion. The income of the estate at
the death of the testator, and even after debts and specific legacies
2. See Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256, 259-60 (1943).
Compare Treas. Reg. 37, art. 53 (1918) with Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(a) (1958) to see
the constancy of the Treasury's position.
3. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(a) (1958).
4. See, e.g., Newton Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 175, 178-79 (1947);
Rev. Rule 54-285, 1954-2 CuM. BuLL. 302.
5. 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
6. Id. at 154.
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had been paid, was more than sufficient to maintain the widow
as required. There was no uncertainty appreciably greater than
the general uncertainty that attends human affairs."
Holmes appears to have adopted a common sense approach - the
full value of the charitable remainder is deductible when, at the time
of the testator's death, no diversion is likely. But Holmes' rationale
proved too much when he said a power to invade principal to the extent
necessary to support a beneficiary in accustomed comfort creates a
standard "fixed in fact and capable of being stated in definite terms
of money." It would seem that the cost of "accustomed comfort"
depends on an individual's propensity to consume goods and services.
While an individual's "accustomed comfort" may be stated in definite
terms of money by totaling an individual's expenditures for food,
housing, clothing, household goods, medical and dental care, trans-
portation, recreation, vacations and miscellaneous items for a given
period of time, this measure is unreliable because it obscures what
"accustomed comfort" really connotes. What the individual may be
accustomed to may not be a $1,500 per year expenditure for food but
chicken every Sunday, not a $3,000 per year housing expense but a
five bedroom house with wall to wall carpeting and two baths, not a
$1,000 annual medical bill but medical attention when needed. Hence,
variations in price due to economic conditions, the possibility of
casualty losses, and the vagaries of health make it impossible to attri-
bute a dollar cost to a -standard of living. It is this inherent flexibility
in the "standard of living" concept that encourages draftsmen to use
it rather than a fixed dollar amount as a measure of permissible
invasion.
The cases which followed Ithaca in the lower federal courts placed
emphasis upon two different segments of its holding. Some courts,
in creating a one stage test, focused upon Holmes' statement that
"there was no uncertainty appreciably greater than the general un-
certainty that attends human affairs" and permitted the deduction
where, under all of the facts and circumstances, it appeared unlikely
that any portion of the charitable remainder would be diverted to a
private purpose.' These courts weighed a variety of factors - the
contingencies on which the power could be exercised, the extent to
which the private beneficiary's income exceeded maintenance needs,
the age and health of the private beneficiary, the probable trust income,
and the competency of the trustee. If a consideration of these variables
led to the conclusion that the possibility of invasion was negligible,
the deduction was allowed.
In contrast the federal courts in the First Circuit focused on
Holmes' statement in Ithaca that the standard of possible invasion
7. Ibid.
8. Commissioner v. Bank of America, 133 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Lucas v.
Mercantile Trust Co., 43 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1930). Cf. Commissioner v. F. G. Bonfils
Trust, 115 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1940) (income tax charitable deduction) ; Hartford-
Connecticut Trust Co. v. Eaton, 36 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1929) (income tax charitable
deduction).
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"was fixed in fact and capable of being stated in definite terms of
money." These courts established a two stage test: (1) the extent
of the possible diversion must be subject to accurate measure; and
(2) the likelihood of exercise of the power must be remote.9 These First
Circuit cases viewed Ithaca as going to "the very verge of law"'" in
its determination that the power of invasion was sufficiently limited to
permit an accurate measure of the extent of the possible invasion.
Accordingly the deduction was denied thereafter if the contingencies
on which the power could be exercised did not relate to the beneficiaries
standard of living - regardless of the fact that the likelihood of diver-
sion was remote. In other words, the courts would conclude that the
possibility of diversion could not be accurately measured, i.e., the first
criterion was not satisfied, and therefore the second question of the
remoteness of the likelihood of exercise of the power would never be
reached.
To resolve this conflict between the one stage test and the First
Circuit two stage test, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner." The Court apparently
adopted the approach of the First Circuit. Notwithstanding a factual
determination by the Tax Court that the charity was virtually certain
to take the full remainder interest, the Supreme Court held that a
power to invade corpus for "the comfort, support, maintenance and/or
happiness of my said wife"' 2 was not limited by a standard definite
enough to permit valuation of the charitable remainder and that there-
fore the deduction must be disallowed. The Court said:
For a deduction.., to be allowed, Congress and the Treasury
require that a highly reliable appraisal of the amount the charity
will receive be available, and made, at the death of the testator.
Rough guesses, approximations, or even the relatively accurate
valuations on which the market place might be willing to act are
not sufficient .... Only where the conditions on which the extent
of invasion of the corpus depends are fixed by reference to some
readily ascertainable and reliable predictable facts do the amounts
which will be directed from the charity and the present value of
the bequest become adequately measurable.'
Mr. Justice Douglas joined Mr. Justice Jackson in dissent on the
grounds that the only question should be whether there was any
real likelihood of the charitable interest being diverted and that the
factual determination of the Tax Court on this point should be upheld.' 4
The majority of the Court carefully distinguished Ithaca by
pointing out that in Merchants Nat'l Bank the power of invasion
9. Commissioner v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 133 F.2d 482 (1st Cir. 1942);
Gammons v. Hassett, 121 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1941). cert. denied, 314 U.S. 673 (1941).
10. Gammons v. Hassett, 121 F.2d 229, 235 (lst Cir. 1941) (Judge Magruder in
concurring opinion), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 673 (1941).
11. 320 U.S. 256 (1943).
12. Id. at 258.
13. Id. at 261.
14. Id. at 263.
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was not restricted to amounts necessary to maintain the widow's
accustomed comfort since the trustee was authorized to invade corpus
if necessary for the wife's "happiness."' 5  But actually the broad
language of the Court is clearly contrary to Ithaca. The majority of
the Court said that a deduction would only be allowed where the
charitable interest can be measured by "reliable statistical data and
techniques."' 6  In Ithaca the deduction was allowed even though the
only limit on the power of invasion was that it was only to be exer-
cised to maintain the beneficiary's accustomed standard of living. As
demonstrated, this standard does not provide a reliable statistical
measure of the extent of possible invasion.
Merchants Nat'l Bank initially created confusion rather than re-
solving the conflict because it both distinguished on the facts and
undermined the rationale of Ithaca. Shortly afterwards, the Fourth
and Ninth Circuits decided cases for the taxpayer by merely saying
that the facts and circumstances were more similar to those in Ithaca
than those in Merchants Nat'l Bank.17 In effect, the courts were
tacitly ignoring the "highly reliable appraisal" requirement in Mer-
chants. In both cases the courts rejected the government's contention
that if the deduction was to be allowed the power of invasion must be
limited by a standard fixed in fact and capable of being stated in
definite terms of money and instead looked at the actual situation to
see if there was any real likelihood of invasion.'i On the other hand,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals theorized that Merchants Nat'l
Bank, although purporting to distinguish Ithaca, may have "so nar-
rowed its scope as virtually to overrule it sub silento . . ..,,,9 and
the First Circuit Court of Appeals continued to hold that "when no
calculable standard is present, no deduction should be allowed . .,"0
Finally, in 1949 the Supreme Court looked at the problem again in
Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.2 and reiterated
that no deduction should be allowed unless the will limits invasion of
corpus to some "ready standard."
15. Id. at 261-63.
16. Id. at 260-61.
17. Commissioner v. Wells Fargo Bank and Trust Co., 145 F.2d 130 (9th Cir.
1944) ; Commissioner v. Robertson's Estate, 141 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1944).
18. The opinions in both cases evince an only slightly veiled displeasure with the
Supreme Court's then recent decision in Merchants Nat'l Bank. Although neither
decision has been expressedly overruled, they were probably implicitly reversed by
Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595 (1949). See State
Street Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 313 F.2d 29, 30 n.2 (1st Cir. 1963);
Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Sargent), 252 F. Supp. 191 n.1(D. Md. 1966). Also a taxpayer failed in an effort to revitalize these cases in Title
Insurance and Trust Co. v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 386, 389-92 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
19. DeCastro's Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 727 (1947).
20. Newton Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 175, 178 (1st Cir. 1947).
21. 335 U.S. 595, 598 (1949). In this case Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in joining
Justices Douglas and Jackson in dissent, recanted his past error and said that "wisdom
too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.
Since I now realize that I should have joined the dissenters in the Merchants Bank
case, 320 U.S. 256, I shall not compound error by pushing that decision still further."
Id. at 600.
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2. THE PRESENT LAW
Following Henslee the cases in the lower federal courts more or
less reached the consensus that if a charitable deduction was to be
allowed, the power of diversion must be limited by an "ascertainable
standard."22 In defining "ascertainable standard," however, they have
created an unhappy marriage between Merchants Nat'l Bank and
Ithaca. In Merchants Nat'l Bank the Court said that the deduction
would only be allowed where the extent of possible diversion of the
charitable remainder could be accounted for accurately by "reliable
statistical data and techniques. ' 23  If the courts were actually to ad-
here to this limitation, deductions could only be allowed where the
extent of possible diversion is limited by a dollar ceiling. 4 But the
concept of the "ascertainable standard" has not been so limited. In-
stead the courts discuss whether the power of diversion is similar to
the power of diversion in Ithaca. If the exercise of the power is
limited to amounts necessary to support the private beneficiary in
his accustomed standard of living, it is said to be limited by an as-
certainable standard;25 if the power permits diversion for purposes
22. But see Bowers v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 228 F.2d 4 (4th Cir. 1955),
where the court either ignores or obscures the "ascertainable standard" requirement.
The question of whether a power of invasion is limited by an "ascertainable
standard" has many consequences under the federal taxing statutes. See, e.g., Estate
Tax: United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962) (INT. Rev. CoDt OF 1954,§§ 2036, 2038); Gift Tax: Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1958) ; Income Tax: INT.
Rgv. COD oF 1954, § 674(d). Although there is some cross-citation of cases, authority
in one area is not reliable in another because of the divergent reasons behind the
requirement. The Treasury consistently seeks that definition most unfavorable to the
taxpayer in the given context. LowND4S & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE & GiFT TAXES
482-84 (2d ed. 1962). This approach is well illustrated by the recent case of Colorado
Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 390 (D. Colo. 1966), where the
will established a trust for the benefit of the testator's wife for life with a remainder
to charity. The wife was given the power to invade corpus for her "proper and
generous support and maintenance." The government successfully argued that the
wife's power was too restricted for the bequest to qualify for the marital deduction
under § 2056(b) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code and too broad for the bequest of
the remainder interest to qualify for the charitable deduction under § 2055.
23. 320 U.S. at 261.
24. Section 20.2031-7 of the Treasury Regulations provides a table of factors that
may be used to determine the present value of an annuity. The cases have recognized
that if there is an annual dollar limit on the extent of possible invasion, the power can
be valued as an annuity, and the excess value of the charitable remainder can be
deducted. See, e.g., Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Weglein),
141 F. Supp. 546 (D. Md. 1956). If the maximum amount necessary to support a
beneficiary in his accustomed standard of living for one year can be established, a
power permitting diversion for this purpose can likewise be valued as an annuity. The
difficulty is that this annual amount cannot be reliably established. But see Rev.
Rul. 54-538, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 316.
25. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. McGowan, 217 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1954)
Blodgett v. Delaney, 201 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1953) ; Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 181 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1950); Berry v. Kuhl, 174 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.
1949) ; Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Sargent), 252 F. Supp.
191, supp. opinion, 254 F. Supp. 647 (D. Md. 1966) ; Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. United States (Havens), 172 F. Supp. 72 (D. Md. 1959); Mercantile-Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Weglein), 141 F. Supp. 546 (D. Md. 1956).
Contra, National Bank of Commerce v. Scofield, 169 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 907 (1949), where the majority said that even though the extent of
possible diversion related to the beneficiary's accustomed standard of living, "the
vagaries and vicissitudes that attend an aged widow . . . are such indeterminate and
variable factors that the ancient criterion of 'judging the future by the past' should
not be applied .. "
Id. at 146. Judge Hutcheson expressed the more typical view in his dissent.
[VOL. XXVI
1966] ESTATE TAXATION OF CHARITABLE REMAINDERS 309
that cannot be said to relate to the private beneficiary's standard of
living, it is said not to be limited by an ascertainable standard.2  Hence,
as applied by the courts, the requirement that a power of diversion be
limited by an ascertainable standard is a term of art meaning either
(1) the extent to which the power may be exercised is limited to a
maximum dollar amount in any one year or to an overall dollar
amount so that the potential diversion can be actuarially predicted, or
(2) the extent to which the power may be exercised is limited to
amounts necessary to maintain an individual's standard of living -
regardless of the fact that the potential diversion cannot be actuarially
predicted. The primary problem in most of the cases is whether, in
fact, the power only permits diversion to support a beneficiary in his
accustomed standard of living where there are only general limitations
on its exercise.
The courts agree that state law determines the construction of
the language creating a power ;27 however, as is so often the case when
a federal taxing statute incorporates state law, there is little authority."
Occasionally, the federal courts will find some state "law" they think
26. Zentmayer v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1964) ; State Street Bank
& Trust Co. v. United States, 313 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1963) ; Seubert v. Shaughnessy,
233 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 255 F.
Supp. 390 (D. Colo. 1966); Salisbury v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 30 (W.D.N.Y.
1966) ; Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 386 (S.D. Cal. 1965) ;
Marine Trust Co. v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 278 (W.D.N.Y. 1965); Vaccaro v.
United States, 224 F. Supp. 307 (D. Mass. 1963) Kline v. United States, 202 F. Supp.849 (N.D. W.Va. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 313 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1963); Commerce
Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. Mo. 1958) ; Merrill Trust Co. v.
United States, 167 F. Supp. 474 (D. Me. 1958) ; In re Bartlett's Estate, 153 F. Supp.674 (E.D. Pa. 1957). But see Bowers v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 228 F.2d 4(4th Cir. 1955), where the court either ignores or obscures this requirement.
Where exercise of the power is left to someone's unfettered discretion, the courts
consistently find that the power is too broad. See, e.g., Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. United States, 228 F.2d 772 (1st Cir. 1956) (invasion if trustee in "its opinion shalldeem wise"). In this context, it is sometimes important to determine whether the
power is held in an individual or fiduciary capacity. If an individual is given absolute
discretion in the exercise of a power, this freedom may derogate other limitations on
the power's exercise. See Merrill Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 474, 476(D. Me. 1958) ; cf. Knoernschild v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 213, 214-15 (7th Cir. 1938).
If complete discretion is vested in a trustee, his fiduciary obligation requires him to
comply with other stated limitations in the power. See Mercantile-Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. (Weglein) v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 546, 552 (D. Md. 1956). See
generally Comment, Trustee's Discretionary Powers: Their Effect on Charitable
Deductions under the Federal Estate Tax, 61 Nw. U.L. lRv. 640 (1966).
27. "State law creates legal interests and rights. The Federal Revenue Acts
designates what interests or rights shall be taxed." Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S.
78, 80 (1940).
28. For example, in Merrill Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 474, 476(D. Me. 1958), the will permitted invasion of principal "if either of my said sisters
determines that more than the net annual income is necessary for her comfortable
care, support and maintenance and her judgment in this respect is to be conclusive...."
The taxpayer argued that Maine law required the sisters to act in good faith in
requesting invasion, but the court said that "no Maine authority has been called to
this court's attention which would require the interpolation of a 'good faith' rule into
the language of this will." Id. at 479.
State courts are, of course, sometimes called upon to construe a power of invasion
when there is some question as to the propriety of its exercise. Cases of this sort
may, at least, tangentially deal with whether invasion is only permitted to maintain
an existing standard of living. See, e.g., Lyter v. Vestal, 355 Mo. 457, 196 S.W.2d 769(1946); O'Neils Estate, 88 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1948) ; Board of Visitors and Governors
of Washington College v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 186 Md. 89, 46 A.2d 280 (1946).
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significant, 9 but more often than not, they have only the manifested
intention of the testator, the language of the instrument, and maxims
such as "ejusdem generis"' 3 and "additional words presumably im-
part additional meaning," 3 ' to guide them.
In most of the cases the testator's intention is illusive because
neither draftsman nor testator appear to have been aware of the
problem and hence have not realized the necessity of a "standard of
living" maximum. Notwithstanding this oversight, many courts divine
some inclination on the part of the testator that exercise of the power
is, or is not, to be limited to an amount necessary to support the
beneficiary in his accustomed standard of living.32 This technique af-
fords the courts a good deal of flexibility. For example, in Zentmayer's
Estate v. Commissioner33 the majority of the court, in holding for the
government, found that the testator intended that the corpus could
be invaded even if it was not necessary for the support of his sister
in her accustomed standard of living. The court said:
The testator was undoubtedly aware that the income from
his $478,000 estate would almost certainly never prove insufficient
for her maintenance .... One would be hard put to it to find any
good reason for the power given to the trustees to invade
principal to an unlimited amount, unless it was that the testator
intended that the principal might be used for anything within
reason that his sister might need or desire. 4
Judge Kaldoner in dissent agreed that the testator's intention governed
the proper construction to be given the power but felt that the testator
only intended invasion if necessary to support the private beneficiary in
her accustomed standard of living. He said:
Read in the context of the entire will and the circumstances
surrounding its execution, i.e., the lifelong standard of modest
living of the sister; the fact that she was 80 years old when the
will was executed; she "had money of her own," and "the testator
was undoubtedly aware that the income from his $478,000 would
29. E.g., Blodget v. Delaney, 201 F.2d 589, 593 (1st Cir. 1953) (previous interpre-
tation of the word "welfare" by a state court) ; Commerce Trust Co. v. United States,
167 F. Supp. 643, 646 (W.D. Mo. 1958) (previous interpretation of the word
"emergency" by a state court). There may be state laws of another sort - an inter-
pretation of the power in question by a probate court. In Bowers v. South Carolina
Nat'l Bank, 228 F.2d 4, 5-6 (4th Cir. 1955), the court based its decision in part on
such a probate order, but in Third Nat'l Bank v. United States, 228 F.2d 772 (1st
Cir. 1956), such an order was ignored because it was not the result of a real
adversary proceeding.
30. See Marine Trust Co. v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 278, 280-81 (W.D.N.Y.
1965).
31. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 313 F.2d 29, 31 (1st
Cir. 1963).
32. E.g., Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 390, 396
(D. Colo. 1966); Marine Trust Co. v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 278, 280-81
(W.D.N.Y. 1965) ; Kline v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 849, 852 (N.D. W.Va. 1962),
aff'd per curiam, 313 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
v. United States (Weglein), 141 F. Supp. 546, 552-53 (D. Md. 1956).
33. 336 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1964).
34. Id. at 491.
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almost certainly never prove insufficient for her maintenance,"
it can only be said that the scrivener of the will, in the mooted
phrase, merely "painted the lily" of the testamentary design.35
When the language of a power in some fashion relates to the
beneficiary's financial needs, some courts have been willing to infer a
standard of living limitation. Through this approach, courts have
found that the following language limits diversion by an ascertainable
standard: "comfortable maintenance and support, '36 "proper care,
support and maintenance, 3 7 "comfort and welfare," 8 "support, mainte-
nance, comfort and general well-being,"39 and "proper support, mainte-
nance and care."'40 The Internal Revenue Service acquiesced in these
decisions to some degree in Revenue Ruling 54-285:
Where the power of invasion is limited by such words as "comfort
and support" with no express standard or limitation in the will or
instrument, such words should be interpreted as meaning the
comfort and support according to the standard of living enjoyed
by the beneficiary prior to the decedent's death, if such interpreta-
tion is consistent with applicable local law, and other terminology
in the will or instrument does not require some different inter-
pretation. 41
On the other hand, courts have been unwilling to infer a standard of
living limitation on powers permitting diversion for the following
purposes: "pleasure, comfort and welfare,' 42 "purposes which may
add to her comfort or convenience, ' 43 "welfare or health, '44 "com-
fortable support and maintenance and for any other reasonable re-
quirement, '4  "support, maintenance, welfare and comfort [and]
... for any other purpose... expedient, necessary or desirable for the
benefit or use"46 and "proper and generous support and maintenance.' '7
When the will permits diversion to meet certain itemized costs,
some courts have also found the power to be limited by an ascertainable
standard. For example, the following language has been found to
create appropriate limitations: "accident, illness, misfortune or other
emergency, ' 48 "accident, illness or other cause, ' 9 "unusual demands,
35. Id. at 493-94.
36. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Eaton, 36 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1929).
37. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1950).
38. Blodget v. Delaney, 201 F.2d 589 (lst Cir. 1953).
39. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Sargent), 252 F.
Supp. 191, supp. opinion, 254 F. Supp. 647 (D. Md. 1966).
40. Commerce Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
41. 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 302.
42. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595 (1949).
43. Seubert v. Shaughnessy, 233 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1956).
44. Commerce Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
45. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 313 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1963).
46. Zentmayer v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 488, 489 (3d Cir. 1964).
47. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 390 (D. Colo.
1966).
48. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Weglein), 141 F.
Supp. 546 (D. Md. 1956).
49. Berry v. Kuhl, 174 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1949).
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emergencies . . . from sickness, accident, or failure of investments"5
and "alleviate any financial emergency." 51 Although it is difficult to
imagine how the occurrence and cost of these fortuities can be reliably
predicted, the courts have reached this result with impeccable logic
while working with what is perhaps a dubious premise. As the court
pointed out in Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. McGowan,2 since
Ithaca has never been reversed, a power to invade corpus to support a
beneficiary according to his accustomed standard of living must be
limited by an ascertainable standard. A power to invade corpus to
support a beneficiary according to 'his accustomed standard of living
authorizes invasion to meet the cost of hospital and medical expenses
or other financial emergencies. Therefore, a power to invade corpus
for hospital and medical expenses or other financial emergencies alone
is more restrictive and, accordingly, must also be limited by an ascer-
tainable standard." The Internal Revenue Service acquiesced in these
holdings to a very limited extent in Revenue Ruling 54-285 where
it stated that "the inclusion of the words 'hospital or medical expenses'
does not enlarge the power of invasion as hospital and medical care
are included within the broad meaning of comfort and support."5 4
However, some courts have also 'been unwilling to find that such lan-
guage relates to the private beneficiary's accustomed standard of living.
For example, the following language has been held not to place a
sufficient limitation on diversion: "illness, accident or other unforeseen
emergency,"55 "best interests . . . [during] . . . illness or emergency
of any kind,"56 "illness, injury, or any circumstances of emergency
affecting . . . welfare or health, ' 5 7 "illness . . . and also in other un-
50. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. McGowan, 217 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1954).
51. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Sargent), 252 F.
Supp. 191, 194 n.2, supp. opinion, 254 F. Supp. 647 (D. Md. 1966).
52. 217 F.2d 287, 292-93 (2d Cir. 1954).
53. Id. at 292-93. The second premise in this syllogism is suspect if "standard of
living" is defined as an individual's propensity to consume goods and services. For
example, assume that the power permits diversion if necessary to support the bene-
ficiary in his accustomed standard of living. If an individual has $10,000 in income
and typically uses all of it buying the goods and services to which he is accustomed,
then the court is correct. An extraordinary medical bill of $5,000 would justify a
$5,000 diversion. But on the other hand, if an individual has $20,000 in income and
typically uses only $10,000 in buying the goods and services to which he is accustomed
and saves the rest, then the court appears incorrect. An extraordinary medical bill
of $5,000 would not justify diversion since the beneficiary could pay the bill from his
current savings and his standard of living would not be interfered with. Hence, a
power to invade if necessary to support an individual in his accustomed standard only
sometimes authorizes invasion to meet the cost of extraordinary expenses.
54. 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 302.
55. DeCastro's Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 727 (1946).
56. In re Bartlett's Estate, 153 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
57. Commerce Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
In this case, the taxpayer in an effort to show that the power was limited by an
ascertainable standard proved that if the life beneficiary became totally disabled it
would take a maximum of $18,000 per year to support her. Id. at 650. The taxpayer's
seemingly sound theory was that if he could prove the maximum potential exercise
of the power, a fortiori it would be limited by a sufficient external standard. Thejudge's obscure response indicates that he missed the point. He said that:
In the instant case it was neither reliably predictable nor even likely that the
life beneficiary would become totally disabled and therefore a measurement of
corpus impairment and resulting valuation of the remainder to charity based on
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foreseen circumstances, '"" and "if . . . incapacitated through illness,
age or other cause . . . toward the support, care and benefit."59 In
deciding these cases, the courts have not replied to the analysis in
Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. McGowan0 but have merely pointed
out the difficulty of determining the extent of the possible diversion.
As the court said in In re Bartlett's Estate, "the phrase 'emergency
of any kind' embraces a multiplicity of conceivable situations the
occurrence, magnitude or effect of which are impossible to forecast."'"
This review of when the courts will infer a standard of living
limitation is oversimplified since it focuses only on the language
creating the power. The courts look not only at the terms of power,
but also at "four corners" of the document, and often indulge in
elaborate syntactical considerations of what modifies what. Excur-
sions into the jungle of verbiage can inure to the benefit of either the
government or the taxpayer. For example, in Kline v. United States"
the court found that a direction to the trustee to exercise the power
"to the same generous extent that I, if living, could do . . ." modified
the trust obligation for maintenance and support and indicated that
the testator intended something more than a mere continuance of the
beneficiary's established mode of living. Also, in Colorado Springs
National Bank v. United States,"3 where the standard provided by the
diversion clause was "proper and generous support and maintenance,"
the court found that since later in the will there was language referring
to the beneficiary's "wishes" and invasion for her "use" and "benefit,"
the testator did not intend to limit diversion to amounts necessary to
maintain the beneficiary's standard of living. Conversely, in Mer-
cantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. (Sargent) v. United States64 the court
found that a power to divert corpus to "alleviate any financial emer-
gency" resulting to the private beneficiaries, when read "in the context
of the whole will," could only be exercised to maintain their existing
standard of living. This same technique of examining the entire will
is also used to distinguish prior cases. For example, in United States
v. Powell65 the instrument permitted invasion for the "maintenance,
that hypothesis cannot be considered in determining this charitable remainder's
value for Federal Estate Tax purposes. Id. at 651.
58. Kline v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. W.Va. 1962), aff'd per curiam,
313 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1963).
59. Salisbury v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 30 (W.D.N.Y. 1966).
60. 217 F.2d 287, 292-93 (2d Cir. 1954).
61. 153 F. Supp. 674, 677 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
62. 202 F. Supp. 849, 852 (N.D. W.Va. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 313 F.2d .633(4th Cir. 1963).
63. 255 F. Supp. 390, 396 (D. Colo. 1966).
64. 252 F. Supp. at 199, supp. opinion, 254 F. Supp. 647 (D. Md. 1966). Judge
Thomsen does not explicitly indicate what else in the will leads him to this conclusion.
Presumably he is referring to the fact that the beneficiaries of the power were the
testator's servants, were only modestly otherwise provided for, and hence, were not
the primary objects of the testator's bounty. See, Item Fourth, section (k) of the
testator's will, set out in 252 F. Supp. at 194 n.2.
65. 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962). This case did not deal with the deductibility
of a charitable bequest but was concerned with whether the grantor of an inter vivos
trust had retained a power to power to alter, amend or revoke under what is now§ 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code. The court held that the retained power was
limited by an ascertainable standard and hence the transferred property was not in
his gross estate. Id. at 828-29.
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welfare, comfort or happiness" of designated beneficiaries. This lan-
guage is almost identical with the language of the power the Supreme
Court found to be too broad in Merchants Natl Bank. The court,
however, held the power to be limited by an ascertainable standard and
distinguished Merchants Nat'l Bank with the following statement:
It is clear, we think, that the court [in Merchants Natl
Bank] accorded such broader connotation to the word "happiness,"
because of the context in which it was found and, particularly, the
instructions to the trustee to exercise its discretion with liberality
to the wife and to consider her welfare, comfort and happiness
prior to claims of the residuary beneficiaries.66
Syntactical ambiguities also give the courts leeway. For example,
in Marine Trust Co. v. United States67 the will permitted diversion
of a charitable bequest "if by reason of sickness, accident, misfortune
or any other circumstances either of my said daughters .shall be or
become in need of funds in the opinion of my trustee for her health,
support, maintenance, comfort, welfare or for any other reason.... 6
The taxpayer argued that the "any other circumstances" and "any
other reason" clauses were limited through use of the word "need."
The court, in rejecting this argument, viewed these clauses as creat-
ing an almost unlimited power of diversion and thus disallowed
the deduction. 9 On the other hand, in Berry v. KuhP° the court dealt
with a power which permitted diversion "if by reason of accident,
illness or other cause, either ... [beneficiary] requires funds for this
treatment, support or maintenance .. ."" The court found that the
uncertainty of "other causes" was cured by "treatment, support or
maintenance" since those words referred to an accustomed standard of
living.7
2
This review of the cases clearly indicates that the courts have
a great deal of leeway in determining whether a power only permits
diversion to support a beneficiary in his accustomed standard of living
and is hence limited by an ascertainable standard. Notwithstanding
this doctrinal flexibility, results can be predicted with some assurance.
Over the past ten years, all of the federal courts, except those
within the Fourth Circuit,73 have refused to make use of the leeway
factors in order to find for the taxpayer. Many of these courts may
66. Id. at 827.
67. 247 F. Supp. 278 (W.D.N.Y. 1965).
68. Id. at 280.
69. Id. at 280-81.
70. 174 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1949).
71. Id. at 566. (Emphasis added.)
72. Id. at 567-68.
73. See Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Sargent), 252
F. Supp. 191, supp. opinion, 254 F. Supp. 647 (D. Md. 1966) ; Union Nat'l Bank v.
Looker, 14 A. Fed. Tax R.2d 6208 (W.D. Va. 1964) (memorandum to counsel);
Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Havens), 172 F. Supp. 72(D. Md. 1956). See note 27 supra for a list of those cases which have found for
the government.
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accept the view recently expressed in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States :"
In a sense in every instance where invasion of principal is
authorized, but the value of the remainder is claimed as a deduc-
tion, the testator has been attempting to eat his cake and have it
too.... [W]e believe the risk of uncertainty should be his and
not the government's."
Some of these courts may not be fully aware of all of the available
flexibility. Since federal judges are generalists, they may have neither
the time nor disposition to ingest all the cases dealing with what con-
stitutes an ascertainable standard. For whatever reason, many opinions
do not include any nice analysis of the precedents, but merely cite the
broad language of Merchant's Nat'l Bank and decide that the power
is not appropriately limited.75
In contrast to the disinclinations of most of the federal courts,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has liberally granted the charitable
deduction 6 and some of the courts within the circuit have followed this
approach. 77 These courts seemingly embrace the following view:
Doubts in taxing statutes should be resolved in favor of the
beneficiary, and funds set aside by a charitably inclined testator
entirely for the benefit of poor, crippled, and orphaned children,
and for the support of the indigent blind, the deaf, the dumb, and
the aged poor, should not be taken for taxes unless such is the
clear intent of the law.78
Judge Thomsen of the Maryland District Court has decided three of
the four cases holding for the taxpayer and has demonstrated a willing-
ness to make use of the leeway to find for the taxpaper.79
B. THE POSSIBILITY OF INVASION REQUIREMENT.
If the taxpayer is successful in establishing that the power of
diversion is limited by an ascertainable standard, he must then prove
that the possibility of any diversion or diversion in excess of an ascer-
tainable portion of the charitable remainder is so remote as to be negli-
74. 313 F.2d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1963).
75. See, e.g., Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 390,
394-96 (D. Colo. 1966) ; Salisbury v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 30, 32 (W.D.N.Y.
1966) ; Vaccaro v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 307 (D. Mass. 1963).
76. See Bowers v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 228 F.2d 4 (4th Cir. 1955) ; Com-
missioner v. Robertson's Estate, 141 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1944).
77. See cases cited in note 74 supra. But see McGraw v. United States, 229 F.
Supp. 118 (W.D. W.Va. 1964) ; Kline v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. W.Va.
1962), affd per curiam, 313 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1963).
78. Lucas v. Mercantile Trust Co., 43 F.2d 39, 43 (8th Cir. 1930).
79. See Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Sargent), 252
F. Supp. 191, supp. opinion, 254 F. Supp. 647 (D. Md. 1966) ; Mercantile-Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. v. United States (Havens), 172 F. Supp. 72 (D. Md. 1959) ; Mercantile-
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Weglein), 141 F. Supp. 546 (D. Md. 1956).
Judge Thomsen also sat with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and wrote the
opinion in Moffett's Estate v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1959), an income
tax charitable deduction case, where he decided for the government.
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gible. This requirement apparently evolved from Holmes' broad
language in Ithaca that the deduction should be allowed where "there
was no uncertainty [that the charity will take] appreciably greater than
the general uncertainty that attends human affairs.""0
Although the Treasury Regulations have provided since 1921 that
"if the legatee, devisee, donee, or trustee is empowered to divert the
property or fund, ... [to a non-charitable purpose] . . . the deduction
will be limited to that portion, if any, of the fund or property which is
exempt from an exercise of the power,"'" the courts have not inter-
preted this language to require that the remainder be actually exempt.82
The Internal Revenue Service has acquiesced in this approach and has
stated:
If it is considered that a standard is fixed by the will or
instrument, there remains for determination the probability of
invasion of corpus for the stated purposes. If there is very little
or no probability of invasion, the deduction should be allowed.
If the facts indicate the probability of invasion to a limited extent
which is calculable in accordance with an ascertainable standard,
the deduction should be denied only to that extent.83
Although the courts have agreed on this verbalization of the rule, the
language is too broad to be of much help in predicting how the cases
will be resolved.8 4 Many of the decisions are likewise of little help
since the courts are generally the trier of the facts and merely state
their conclusions with only veiled reference to what was in the record.
However, some of the courts create a verbal formula that gives some
additional substance to the requirement.
1. THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY DIVERSION.
Where the taxpayer is attempting to prove that the possibility of
any diversion is so remote as to be negligible, the courts first look at
the terms of the power. In the majority of litigated cases, the terms
of the power permit diversion of corpus if necessary to support a
private beneficiary in his accustomed standard of living. Looking at
80. 279 U.S. 151, 154 (1929).
81. Compare Treas. Reg. 63, art. 50 (1921), with Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b)
(1958).
82. Although the cases often cite this section of the Regulations, they ignore its
seemingly clear meaning in reaching their conclusion. E.g., Mercantile-Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. v. United States (Sargent), 252 F. Supp. 191, 195, 198, supp. opinion,
254 F. Supp. 647 (D. Md. 1966). Only Judge Haney, in his dissenting opinion in
Commissioner v. Bank of America, 133 F.2d 753-55 (9th Cir. 1943), appears to have
taken this language literally.
83. Rev. Rul. 54-285, 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 302.
84. An example of one of the few jury instructions can be found in Hamilton
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 n.3 (E.D. Tenn. 1965), where
the court instructed the jury as follows:
What is meant by the phrase possibility which is so remote as to be negligible?
It is, generally speaking, a chance which persons generally would disregard as so
highly impossible that it might be ignored with reasonable safety in undertaking
a serious business transaction. It is likewise a chance which every dictate of
reason and common sense would justify an intelligent person in disregarding as
so highly impossible and remote as to be ignored as lacking in reason and substance.
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the facts as they existed at the decedent's death, the courts measure
the beneficiary's standard of living in terms of annual dollars, estimates
of the prospective annual income available to the beneficiary from other
sources, and if the prospective income is sufficiently in excess of prospec-
tive annual needs, it will find that the possibility of invasion is so
remote as to be negligible.8 5 Some courts will add other factors to the
equation. Most of them appear to 'be makeweights - the spending
habits and state of health of the private beneficiary, the management
capabilities and conservatism of the trustee. One appears significant.
In the recent case of Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United
States (Sargent)"6 the will provided that income in excess of the
amount needed to pay certain annuities was to be accumulated. Since at
the date of death it appeared likely that $20,000 in annual income would
be available to pay $8,000 in annuities, the court was able to say that
"the chance that it would be necessary to invade principal for their
benefit (beyond the amount of income which was being accumulated
annually) was so remote as to be negligible."8 Hence, if it can be
shown that income is likely to 'be accumulated, this factor can be used
to further reduce the possibility of any invasion of the remainder
interest claimed as a charitable deduction.
2. THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTIAL DIVERSION.
When the taxpayer is only attempting to qualify a portion of the
remainder interest, instead of the entire remainder, for the charitable
deduction by showing that the possibility of invasion in excess of a
calculable amount is so remote as to be negligible, his problem is more
difficult. The only cases that have been found where the taxpayer was
successful in this effort involved powers that were limited in their
exercise to a fixed annual amount.88 In these cases the power was
valued as if it were an annuity, and the 'taxpayer was allowed to deduct
the excess value of the charitable remainder. Where the power per-
mits invasion to support a beneficiary in his accustomed standard of
living, the courts have been unwilling to permit deduction of a
portion of the charitable remainder, primarily because the taxpayer has
been unable to prove the amount of the portion. This is not hard to
comprehend. Although the courts say that such a power is limited by
an "ascertainable standard," the extent of exercise of such a power is
not really susceptible of measurement in terms of dollars. Hence, the
courts, while willing to make the broad decision that no diversion of
85. See, e.g., Gammons v. Hassett, 121 F.2d 229, 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1941);
Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Sargent), 252 F. Supp. 191,
198, supp. opinion, 254 F. Supp. 647 (D. Md. 1966). If the applicable local law or the
terminology of the instrument requires the private beneficiary to exhaust all of his
assets - income and corpus - before the power may be exercised this may be used
to reduce further the likelihood of an exercise of the power. Mercantile-Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. v. United States (Weglein), 141 F. Supp. 546, 552-53 (D. Md. 1956).
86. 252 F. Supp. 191, supp. opinion, 254 F. Supp. 647 (D. Md. 1966).
87. Id. at 199.
88. See Berry v. Kuhl, 174 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Mercantile-Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. United States (Weglein), 141 F. Supp. 546 (D. Md. 1956).
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corpus is likely, have been unwilling to refine this judgment and say
that no diversion in excess of a calculable portion of the remainder in-
terest is probable.
Perhaps, in some future case the taxpayer will be able to qualify
a portion of a remainder for a charitable deduction where the corpus
can be diverted to support a beneficiary in his accustomed standard
of living. This result might be accomplished by proving to the satisfac-
tion of the court or jury the maximum amount which could be diverted
under the power in any given year. By using this figure as if it were
an annuity to measure the extent of the total possible invasion,
the taxpayer should be successful in qualifying the excess of the
remainder for the deduction."9
In all of the cases, whether the power is limited by a fixed annual
amount or by the accustomed standard of living concept, where the
taxpayer attempts to qualify a portion of a remainder for the charitable
deduction, there is a latent problem. For example, in Mercantile-Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. (Weglein) v. United States"° the will left the
residuary estate to a seventy-six year old beneficiary for life with the
remainder to charity. The beneficiary also had an unqualified right to
withdraw $3,000 per year from principal. The government and the
taxpayer agreed that in determining the deduction, the value of the
residuary estate must be reduced by the present value of the beneficiary's
power of invasion - 3,000 x factor 4.651 (76 years of age)
$13,953."' This approach maintains internal consistency since the
present value of the remainder interest is also determined according to
the beneficiaries' life expectancy. However, the $13,953 reduction
merely represents the maximum amount of diversion in the average
case, and if the beneficiary should outlive her life expectancy, certainly
not a possibility so remote as to be negligible, greater diversion is
possible. Hence, in some future case the government might success-
fully contend that the reduction should be not measured by the annual
amount permitted to be diverted times the beneficiary's life expectancy
but times the number of years beyond which the possibility of the
beneficiary's living is negligible.9"
89. This approach is given some support by the Internal Revenue Service's ruling
that "the amount required annually for the donor's support according to his accus-
tomed mode of living may be ascertained and valued as an annuity." Rev. Rul. 54-538,
1954-2 CuM. BULL. 316, modified on other grounds, Rev. Rul. 62-13, 1962-1 CuM. BULL.
181. However, the service should not be expected to abide by this ruling in the
charitable deduction context. The ruling was made so that a gift in trust would not
be rendered wholly incomplete and hence not subject to the gift tax merely because
the trustee could apply corpus for the donor's support. Cf. Commerce Trust Co. v.
United States, 167 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
90. 141 F. Supp. 546 (D. Md. 1956).
91. Id. at 548.
92. Cf. Moffett's Estate v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1959). As this
article goes to press a case has been reported in which the government made this
argument. In Estate of Schildkraut v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 40, 44-45 (2d Cir.
1966), it contended that if the life beneficiary lived to be 84 (eleven years past her
actuarial life expectancy) all of the corpus might be consumed and that therefore no
charitable deduction should be allowed. The court rejected this contention saying that
the estimate of the amount of possible diversion should be based either on the bene-
ficiary's actuarial life expectancy or on the beneficiary's actual life expectancy if there
is evidence in the particular case that it is materially different. Id. at 49.
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C. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF POST-DEATi EVENTS.
There is a problem as to the admissibility of evidence of post-death
events that may be offered to show the potentiality of the exercise
of a power of diversion. In Ithaca 3 Mr. Justice Holmes decided
that a charitable remainder created by a will must be valued according
to the facts as they existed at the time of the testator's death, and
therefore the premature death of the life beneficiary before the filing
date for the estate tax return could not be used to increase its value.
Subsequent cases have extended this limitation by holding that the
likelihood of the exercise of a power, in the absence of a specific
statutory exception, must also be determined according to the facts
as they existed at the time of the testator's death.9 4 Section 2055(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code establishes two exceptions: (1) if the
beneficiary of an irrevocable power disclaims his interest before the
date prescribed for filing the estate tax return; or (2) if the power
terminates because of the beneficiary's death or for any other reason
before the date prescribed for filing the estate tax return, the existence
of the power at the date of death shall be disregarded in determining
the charitable deduction. 5
The problem is the extent to which a court should admit evidence
of post-death events which does not fall within these statutory ex-
ceptions. At the outset it should be noted that notwithstanding the
fact that the probability of diversion is to be determined at the time of
the testator's death, post-death occurrences can be relevant. For ex-
ample, if a will permits invasion of corpus necessary to support a
private beneficiary in his accustomed standard of living, all of the
following post-death events have some probative value in determining
the potentiality of exercise at the testator's death. The death of the
private beneficiary after the death of the testator but before the case
comes to trial casts considerable light on the probable duration of the
power at the date of the testator's death since there will be no further
exercise of the power. The actual income and expenditures of the
private beneficiary subsequent to the testator's death has some inferen-
tial value in determining whether the private beneficiary's separate
income is likely to be adequate to meet his needs at the time of
testator's death. Also, a decision of a probate court construing the
power of diversion shows how the power is likely to be interpreted at
the testator's death.96
However, in Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. McGowan9 7 the court
found as reversible error the admission of evidence showing the value
93. 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929).
94. E.g., Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600
(1948) ; Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. McGowan, 217 F.2d 287, 293 (2d Cir. 1954).
95. INT. lUv. CoDn oV 1954, § 2055 (a).
96. With respect to orders of a probate construing a will there are other problems
besides relevance. In Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 228 F.2d 772,
773 (lst Cir. 1956), the court ignored an order of the probate court interpreting a will
so as to restrict invasion of corpus to sums necessary to support a beneficiary in his
accustomed standard of living because it was not issued as a result of a controversy
between adversary parties. But see Bowers v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 228 F.2d 4,
5-6 (4th Cir. 1955).
97. 217 F.2d 287, 293-94 (2d Cir. 1954).
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of the private beneficiary's assets six years after the testator's death
and her income and expenditures during the six-year period. The
court, tacitly admitting the relevance of the proof, said:
In the instant case, most of the evidence the admission of
which the [government] . ..resisted, was calculated to impress
the jury with the meager likelihood of any future exercise of the
right to invade subsequent to trial. No effort appears to have
been made to relate these events and circumstances to the
potentiality, on the date of the testator's death, of exercise of the
right to invade....
It can hardly be doubted that the erroneous admission of
this evidence, which may well have effected a substitution in the
minds of the jurors of actual events and circumstances occurring
after the testator's death for the jury's estimate of the likelihood
on the date of death of the exercise of the right to invade principal,
resulted in material prejudice to the [government] .... 9
Thus, it appears that relevance is not enough. It is of primary
importance that the probative value must outweigh the prejudicial
danger of focusing the trier of fact's attention on what has actually
happened. As the court also said in Lincoln Rochester Trust Co.,
"[O]nly those events occurring after the testator's death which have
sufficiently high probative value in establishing or clarifying the cir-
cumstances as they existed at the time of the testator's death may
properly be considered in making the factual determination as to the
probability and extent of exercise of a right to invade."99 This line
is hard to draw. In several cases the lower courts have let in evidence
of post-death events where the parties raised no objections,' but in
Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner'' the decision
of the Tax Court for the government was reversed because it had been
influenced by evidence of actual diversion of principal subsequent to
the testator's death.
Judge Thomsen of the Maryland District Court has been faced
with this problem in three cases over the past ten years and has de-
veloped a progressively more liberal view of admissibility. In a 1956
case he excluded evidence offered by the taxpayer showing that the
private beneficiary, subsequent to the testator's death, had lived within
her income and that no invasion had been necessary.' In a 1959 case
Judge Thomsen admitted evidence showing that after the testator's
death the private beneficiary had become senile and had been adjudi-
cated incompetent, and also that her income exceeded her expenses.
However, he found that the possibility of diversion was negligible
98. Id. at 293-94.
99. Id. at 293.
100. See Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 n.9; Bowers v.South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 228 F.2d 4, 5-6 (4th Cir. 1955); DeCastro's Estate v.
Commissioner, 155 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 727 (1946).
101. 145 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1944).
102. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Weglein), 141 F.
Supp. 546, 549 (D. Md. 1956).
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without considering this evidence." 3 In a 1966 case Judge Thomsen
admitted evidence disclosing the actual income and expenses of the
private beneficiary after the testator's death "only to show what might
reasonably have been expected at the time of ... [the testator's] death"
and found that the possibility of invasion was so remote as to be
negligible.10 4
From this survey it appears that definite rules have not been
evolved to determine the admissibility of evidence of post-death events
with probative value. Instead a balance between probative value and
possible prejudice has been achieved on a case by case basis. Perhaps
the following generalizations can validly be made. First, courts appear
disinclined to admit evidence that resolves the ultimate question in the
controversy because the possibility of prejudice is so great. For ex-
ample, evidence which establishes either that the power has terminated
without being exercised or that diversion in fact has been necessary
will be excluded since the trier of the facts cannot be expected to look
at the evidence only to see what reasonably could have been expected at
the testator's death. On the other hand, evidence which merely shows
the private beneficiary's actual income and expenditures in years
immediately subsequent to the testator's death is more likely to be ad-
mitted since it is less subject to misuse. Second, courts will probably
be more inclined to admit evidence of post-death events in a non-jury
case than in a jury case because they have more confidence in their own
ability to look at evidence for a limited purpose.
III. THE TREASURY REGULATIONS
Ideally the Treasury Regulations provide a vehicle through which
the Treasury can notify the courts and the taxpayer of its administra-
tive interpretation of a statute. The Treasury has an obligation to make
its interpretation reasonably correspond with the interpretation given
the taxing statute by the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, in this area
the Treasury's statement is neither clear nor fairly representative of
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute.
Section 20.2055-2 of the Treasury Regulation concerning "trans-
fers not exclusively for charitable purposes" provides:
(a) Remainders and similar interests. If a trust is created
or property is transferred for both a charitable and a private
purpose, deduction may be taken of the value of the charitable
beneficial interest only insofar as that interest is presently ascer-
tainable, and hence severable from the non-charitable interest. The
present value of a remainder or other deferred payment to be made
for a charitable purpose is to be determined in accordance with the
rules stated in § 20.2031-7 ...
(b) Transfers subject to a condition or a power. If, as of
the date of a decedent's death, a transfer for charitable purposes
103. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Havens), 172 F. Supp.
72, 75-76 (D. Md. 1959).
104. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Sargent), 252 F.
Supp. 191, 198, supp. opinion, 254 F. Supp. 647 (D. Md. 1966).
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is dependent upon the performance of some act or the happening of
a precedent event in order that it might become effective, no deduc-
tion is allowable unless the possibility that the charitable transfer
will not become effective is so remote as to be negligible. If an
estate or interest has passed to or is vested in charity at the time of
a decedent's death and the estate or interest would be defeated by
the performance of some act or the happening of some event, the
occurrence of which appeared to have been highly improbable at
the time of the decedent's death, the deduction is allowable. If the
legatee, devisee, donee, or trustee is empowered to divert the
property or fund, in whole or in part, to a use or purpose which
would have rendered it, to the extent that it is subject to such
power, not deductible had it been directly so bequeathed, devised,
or given by the decedent, the deduction will be limited to that
portion, if any, of the property or fund which is exempt from an
exercise of the power. ... .0
Since the concern here is with a charitable bequest subject to a prior life
estate and a power of diversion, both subsections seem to be pertinent.
Subsection (a) appears to correspond with the judicially developed
requirement that the power be limited by an ascertainable standard.
However, in Commissioner v. Sternberger's Estate'0 6 the Supreme
Court held that subsections (a) and ('b) were mutually exclusive -
subsection (a) applying exclusively to deferred assured bequests and
subsection (b) applying exclusively to charitable bequests subject to a
condition or power. Although the Court formulated this interpreta-
tion in a case not involving a power of diversion, if the Court's broad
language is accepted, there is nothing in the Regulations requiring
that a power of diversion be limited by an ascertainable standard.
Two sentences in subsection (b) appear to apply to a charitable
remainder subject to a power of diversion to a private beneficiary.
Since the remainder is vested subject to defeasance, the second sentence
in the subsection would seem to say that the deduction will be allowed
where the possibility of the exercise of the power appears "highly im-
probable." On the other hand, the third sentence says the deduction
will be allowed only with respect to that portion of the remainder that
is "exempt" from an exercise of the power.
This inconsistency can be explained only in light of the historical
development of the Regulations. The third sentence of what is now
section 20.2055(2) (b) was first placed in the regulations in 1921.107
The regulation at that time read:
Art. 50 Conditioned Bequests. - Where the transfer is de-
pendent upon the performance of some act or the happening of
105. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2 (1958).
106. 348 U.S. 187, 190-94 (1955), in this case the testator left a charitable bequest
to take effect only if the decedent's childless daughter died without descendants. The
court disallowed the deduction even though the taxpayer was able to produce an
actuarial computation of the present value of the charity's interest because the possi-
bility that the charity would not take was not "negligible" or "highly improbable."
Id. at 194-98. Mr. Justice Reed joined Mr. Justice Douglas in dissent.
107. Treas. Reg. 63, art. 50 (1921).
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some event in order to become effective, it is necessary that the
performance of the act or the occurrence of the event shall have
taken place before the deduction can be allowed.
Where the legatee, devisee, donee, or trustee is empowered
to divert the property or fund, in whole or in part, to a use or
purpose which would have rendered it, to the extent that it is
subject to such power, not deductible had it been directly so
bequeathed, devised or given by the decedent, deduction will be
limited to that portion, if any, of the property or fund which is
exempt from an exercise of such power.'08
The Government was then taking the unequivocally restrictive view
that a deduction would be allowed only to the extent that the charity
was absolutely assured of getting the bequest. This view was rejected
by the Supreme Court in 1929 in Ithaca°9 where the Court permitted
a deduction for a bequest assured in fact but conditional in form. The
Treasury finally got around to modifying the Regulations to reflect
this development in 1942,110 but in making the modification the Treas-
ury neglected to change what is now the third sentence of subsection
(b). Hence, the requirement that a bequest be "exempt" from the
power has not been a tenable statement of the law since 1929.
Despite the fact that the Regulations are replete with ambiguity
and contain at least one complete misstatement of the law, the courts
make a fetish out of reprinting the Regulations in their decisions
indicating that they are an appropriate implementation of the
statute."' However, while paying lip-service to the significance of the
Regulations, the courts appear to ignore them in making their de-
cisions. For example, only one instance has been found where a Judge
attempted to literally apply the requirement that the bequest be
108. Ibid.
109. 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
110. The section was changed to read as follows:
If as of the date of decedent's death the transfer to charity is dependent upon
the performance of some act or the happening of a precedent event in order that
it might become effective, no deduction is allowable unless the possibility that
charity will not take is so remote as to be negligible. If an estate or interest has
passed to or is vested in charity at the time of decedent's death and such right or
interest would be defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of
some event which appeared to have been highly improbable at the time of decedent's
death, the deduction is allowable.
If the legatee, devisee, donee, or trustee is empowered to divert the property
or fund, in whole or in part, to a use or purpose which would have rendered it,
to the extent that it is subject to such power, not deductible had it been directly
so bequeathed, devised, or given by the decedent, deduction will be limited to that
portion, if any, of the property or fund which is exempt from an exercise of
such power. Treas. Reg. 81, art. 47 (1942). (Emphasis added.)
111. See, e.g., Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595(1949); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943); Bowers v.
South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 228 F.2d 4 (4th Cir. 1955) ; Mercantile-Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. United States, (Sargent), 252 F. Supp. 191, supp. opinion, 254 F. Supp. 647(D. Md. 1966) ; Merrill Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 474 (D. Me. 1958).
For a discussion of whether re-enactment of the statute after promulgation of the
Regulations gives the Regulations the force of law, see Commissioner v. Sternberger's
Estate, 348 U.S. 187, 205 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
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"exempt" from the power of diversion, and he was forced to dissent."1
Hence the Treasury Regulations confuse rather than clarify.
IV. AN APPRAISAL.
In the last five years the federal courts have dealt with eleven
cases"' involving the deductibility of bequests to charity which are
subject to diversion to private beneficiaries. Many more such con-
troversies undoubtedly were resolved in the Tax Court or were settled
administratively. The inordinate number of disputes involving this
narrow point of law is not difficult to explain.
The responsibility for the large number of disputes must be shared
by the bar, the bench, and the Treasury. Perhaps, in a very small per-
centage of the disputed cases, the power of diversion is drafted with
the full understanding of both the lawyer and the testator that the
charitable bequest may not qualify for the charitable deduction. If the
testator is adamant that the private beneficiary be given unrestricted
access to the corpus, this result cannot be avoided. However, in most
instances, the testator only wants to assure that the private beneficiary
will be able to live in accustomed comfort, and the power of diversion
is drafted without a complete understanding of the tax consequences.
Time and again the problem is not that the power is inherently too
broad but rather that the magic words of "ascertainable standard"
are not included."14
If the testator wishes to establish a trust for the benefit of his wife
for life with a remainder to charity and also to insure that she will be
able to live in accustomed comfort, this desire can be accomplished
through proper drafting with ,substantial assurance that some charitable
deduction will be granted and with a possibility that the full remainder
interest will qualify. The following clause furnishes an example:
If at any time or times during the terms of this trust, the net
income thereof payable to my wife, together with all income that
112. See Judge Haney's dissenting opinion in Commissioner v. Bank of America,
133 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1943). As far as this writer has been able to determine
no other court has attempted to rebut Judge Haney's patently correct reading of
the Regulation.
113. Zentmayer's Estate v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1964); State
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 313 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1963) ; Colorado
Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 390 (D. Colo. 1966) ; Mercantile-
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States (Sargent), 252 F. Supp. 191, supp. opinion,
254 F. Supp. 647 (D. Md. 1966); Salisbury v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 30
(W.D.N.Y. 1966); Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.
Cal. 1965); Marine Trust Co. v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 278 (W.D.N.Y. 1965);
McGraw v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Va. 1964) ; Union Nat'I Bank v.
Looker, 14 A. Fed. Tax R.2d 6208 (N.D. W.Va. 1964) (memorandum to counsel);
Vaccaro v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 307 (D. Mass. 1963) ; Kline v. United States,
202 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. W.Va. 1962), affd' per curiam, 313 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1963).
114. This conclusion is, of course, difficult to substantiate. However, in the follow-
ing cases it would seem that the power could have been limited by an "ascertainable
standard" through the inclusion of a "standard of living" modifier, without significantly
limiting the occasions on which it might be exercised. E.g., Merchants Nat'l Bank v.
Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943) ; State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,
313 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1963) ; Salisbury v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 30 (W.D.N.Y.
1966). This is especially true because generally the charity is the only party with an
adverse interest, and it generally will be loathe to call into question an exercise of
the power for fear of a loss of goodwill.
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she may receive from any source, shall not be sufficient to enable
her to maintain the mode of living to which she has been accus-
tomed as my wife, I authorize and direct the trustee to pay my
wife, in addition to the net income of this trust, such sum or sums
from principal as my trustee shall deem necessary, but in no event
shall such sums exceed $ in any one calendar year.
This clause accomplishes several objectives. By placing a maximum
dollar limit on the extent of annual invasion, there is assurance that
any difference between the value of the charitable remainder and the
value of the power (treated as annuity-amount times the wife's life
expectancy at date of testator's death) will be deductible. The appro-
priate dollar maximum can be determined by calculating the annual
amount necessary to -support the wife in her accustomed comfort,
taking into account the possibility of inflation. Furthermore, since
invasion is only permitted when necessary to support the wife in the
accustomed standard of living, it is according to the case law limited
by an "ascertainable standard." Hence, if the taxpayer is able to show
that the likelihood of invasion is remote, the full value of the charitable
remainder will qualify for the deduction. The taxpayer is aided in
meeting his burden of proof by the provision that invasion is only
permissible when the wife's income from all sources is inadequate.
The courts and the Treasury must also share the responsibility
for the volume of litigation. The Supreme Court's several decisions
in this area have left more problems unresolved than decided. The
lower federal courts have developed the law so that it is replete with
flexibility. The Treasury Regulations are neither clear nor fairly
representative of the law. The net result is that the outcome of many
disputes is difficult to predict; settlement is discouraged and litigation
is encouraged.
A deduction for 'bequests to charitable organizations is justifiable,
if at all, 'because these organizations perform functions beneficial to
the community at large. Certainly the government has an interest in
seeing that the deduction is granted only when the bequest will in fact
inure to charity." 5 Under the present law, however, this is frequently
accomplished through substantial expenditures of legal and judicial
effort."' Moreover, the only issue in most of the eases is whether the
power of diversion is limited by an ascertainable -standard. It is diffi-
115. See GRISWOLD, CAS-S ON TAXATION 1075-76 (6th ed. 1966), for a general
discussion of the merits and demerits of allowing a charitable deduction.
116. It is difficult to estimate the cost that can be attributed to these cases but a
rough guess can be made. The cost of the eleven cases that have reached the federal
courts within the last five years might be conservatively approximated as follows:
Taxpayer's lawyer fee- - - $5,000 x 11 = $ 55,000
Government's litigation costs-- 2,500 x 11 = 27,500
Variable cost per case to court system-- 3,000 x 11 = 33,000
$115,500
Seen generally Tolman, The Taxpayer's Stake in the Courts, 287 Annals 127, 131-32
(1953). Recognizing that only a small portion of the disputes reach the federal
courts, it seems that over the last five years the costs have run into the hundreds of
thousands of dollars. These costs are "wasted" in that they deplete the revenue of
either the charity or the government.
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cult to see why this should be a separate requirement for deductibility.
The broadness of the contingencies upon which a power can be exercised
i's a significant factor in determining whether the possibility of any
diversion or diversion in excess of a calculable amount is remote. But,
if it can be established by considering all the circumstances that this
possibility of diversion is remote, the charity -is substantially assured of
benefiting regardless of how broad the power.1 7 Hence, most of the
litigation involves an issue of whether the power may only be exercised
to support a beneficiary in his accustomed standard of living - a
question which in and of itself 'has little to do with government's real
concern of whether the remainder will inure to the benefit of charity.
It would certainly seem that the law should be changed to provide
a more efficient way of assuring that a charitable bequest will not be
allowed where the charity will not benefit. Although the law is a
product of judicial evolution, there appears little likelihood of im-
provement in the law through the decision-making process. Significant
differences in the application of the law in the various federal circuits
presently exist. The Supreme Court, the only bench in a position to
effect an overall revision of the law, appears disinclined to venture back
in the taxpaying thicket. Hence, revision must come through legislation.
Judge Magruder has suggested either of the following two al-
ternatives:
(1) To deny the charitable deduction unless the testator
has given an indefeasible remainder to charity upon the death of
the life tenant, or (2) to allow the deduction in full wherever it
is properly found as a fact upon consideration of all circumstances
that the chance of invasion of the corpus is negligible, however
broadly or narrowly the power to invade corpus may be expressed
in the will." 8
Each proposal has advantages and disadvantages. The first would be
efficient and would completely do away with the flood of cases and the
attendant waste of judicial time and litigation costs, but would deny
the charitable deduction in many cases where the charity is in fact
assured of taking. The second would direct the court's attention to
the real question in issue rather than the extraneous inquiry into
whether the power is limited by an "ascertainable standard," but would
still result in a great deal of litigation of the factual question.
117. In his concurring opinion in Gammons v. Hassett, 121 F.2d 229, 234-35 (1st
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 674, Judge Magruder aptly illustrated the anomalous
consequences that sometimes result from the use of an "ascertainable standard" test
as separate requirement for deductibility. He pointed out that in Ithaca Trust Co. v.
United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929), at the time of the testator's death the life bene-
ficiary of the power was sixty-one years old and the will permitted diversion of the
charitable remainder if necessary to support her in accustomed comfort. A shrinkage
in yield might have necessitated invasion, but the Supreme Court reversing a finding
of fact by the trial court, found this possibility to be remote and allowed the deduction.
See 64 Ct. Cl. 686, 691 (1928). In Gammons the life beneficiary was ninety-three
years old and bedridden, had income greatly in excess of her needs and the will per-
mitted invasion for her needs or desires. Even though the charity was virtually certain
to get corpus intact the deduction was disallowed because the contingencies upon the
powers might be exercised were too broad.
118. Blodget v. Delaney, 201 F.2d 589, 595 (lst Cir. 1953) (concurring opinion).
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Perhaps the best solution 9 is a third alternative somewhere
between these two - to permit the deduction to the extent that the
value of the remainder interest exceeds the value of the power, where the
value of the power can be measured by recognized actuarial techniques,
i.e., where it is limited by an annual dollar amount or overall dollar
limit. This approach would be efficient, permitting a determination of
the deduction on an arithmetic basis without consideration of factual
issues. It would be internally consistent with other provisions of the
federal estate tax law, valuing the power in the same fashion that a
life estate is valued. The law of averages would assure that the
government gets the tax to which it is entitled. It would make the
testator decide the extent to which he wishes to hedge his philanthropy.
It is true that the deduction would be denied to some bequests condi-
tional in form but assured in fact. But this result would not do violence
to the public interest. Since both the federal government and charities
engage in public uses, the real -interest of the community is that either
the government or the charity receives the revenue with the least
possible diminution due to lawyers' fees and court costs.
119. The American Law Institute has proposed yet another solution. It suggests
that a bequest to charity be initially disallowed if subject to a power of diversion. A
refund is then allowed if it later turns out that the charity in fact receives benefits
under the transfer. ALI FXDgRAL ESTATX AND GIFT TAX PROJECT, Study Draft No. 1,
§ X26 (1965). This writer has no real quarrel with the proposal but merely feels that
the goal is not of sufficient value to justify the establishment of special administra-
tive machinery.
